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Constraints on Damage Claims Under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act
Daniel Solomon*
I. Introduction
The legal system's response to racial discrimination has fo-
cused almost exclusively on stopping its effects on the victimized
group rather than compensating individual victims for their inju-
ries.' Recent discussion questions the extent to which the legal
system should affirmatively act to end racial discrimination. Two
views of remedies predominate the dialogue.
The most prominent view is that racial discrimination results
from the discrete acts of identifiable perpetrators. 2 Accordingly, a
remedy must restrict the perpetrator's activity to prevent future
racially discriminatory behavior.3 The other view adopts a victim's
perspective. By this definition, discrimination is historically per-
petuated by society and the condition of the class of victims indi-
cates its presence. Thus, appropriate remedies must both provide
specific opportunities for the victim class as a whole and change
the social and institutional behavior of the perpetrators. The con-
dition of the victim class is the standard against which the success
* B.A. 1981, University of Michigan; J.D. 1985, University of Minnesota.
1. Professor Abram Chayes observed that the judiciary's view of remedies is
generally different in common law and statutory disputes. In statutory or "public
law" litigation
[r]elief is not conceived as compensation for past wrong in a form logi-
cally derived from the substantive liablity and confined in its impact to
the immediate parties; instead, it is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc
on flexible and broadly remedial lines, often having important conse-
quences for many persons including absentees.
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1302 (1976). These remedial initiatives of the judiciary have been character-
ized as legitimate, although counter-majoritarian, especially in the context of civil
rights. Chayes, 1313-16; William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution" Insti-
tutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635 (1982); Robert M.
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale
L.J. 1287 (1982).
2. Phillip B. Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1, 18.
3. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1979).
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of a remedy should be measured.4
Despite obvious differences, these two views share much.
Both agree that there is a relationship between the conditions or
events which give rise to legally cognizable rights and the appro-
priateness of various remedies. The nature of the discrimination
determines the nature of the remedy. Moreover, both views are
oriented towards the future. Although they disagree on the scope
of discrimination's effects, both assume that offering victims their
wrongfully denied opportunities is a more desirable remedy than
granting compensatory damages.5 Past discriminatory acts only
serve as the impetus initiating a process, which, if successful, will
benefit the victims. The victims' loss from the discriminatory act
and its individual consequences are not the measure of the
remedy.
When it ignores the victims' personal experience of discrimi-
nation, the legal system fails to provide a complete remedy for the
injury. Essential to Anglo-American jurisprudence is the belief
that injuries should be compensated.6 A compensatory award is
substitutional relief for the loss endured. Racial discrimination in-
jures people. Quite simply, therefore, those injured by racial dis-
crimination should be individually compensated for their losses,
not merely collectively compensated as members of a disadvan-
taged group.7 There are system-wide justifications for compensa-
tion. For example, compensation economically discourages
4. J. Skelly Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 213 (1980). Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Work-
ing Women (1979).
5. The legal system's antagonism toward compensatory relief reflects at least
two conditions. First, civil rights attorneys have not always worked in the best in-
terests of their clients. Kenney Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13
Ariz. L. Rev. 805 (1971); Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration, Ideals, and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976); Leroy
Clark, The Lawyer in the Civil Rights Movement-Catalytic Agent or Counter-Revo-
lutionary?, 19 U. Kan. L. Rev. 459 (1971); Comment, The New Public Interest Law-
yers, 79 Yale L.J. 1069 (1970). Second, whites cannot be expected to give up the
favorable positions which they have obtained in part through discrimination. John
Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 723, 735 (1974). Compensatory awards pose a more immediate threat to
whites' social position than do future-oriented remedies. While future-oriented
remedies merely reduce the opportunities, compensatory awards require disgorge-
ment of gained wealth or position.
6. See Dan Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 135 (1973).
7. This is a neutral standard. If either a white or a Black person was found to
have been discriminated against on the basis of race, s/he would be compensated. I
am uncomfortable, however, with the notion that all race-conscious acts should be
considered impermissibly "discriminatory," as the Supreme Court held in Bakke.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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discrimination and provides an incentive to the injured to seek ju-
dicial redress. But these reasons are secondary. Primarily, com-
pensation expresses a commitment to provide justice to the
individual.
Judicial interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
19648 reflects this disregard for compensating discrimination vic-
tims for their injuries. Title VI explicitly prohibits recipients of
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of race.9 Although
the Act expressly provides for administrative enforcement only,
courts have implied a statutory cause of action for private individu-
als. Thus, individuals have been able to sue their schools,10 em-
ployers," managers of housing projects' 2 and other federal fund
recipients under Title VI.13 However, this individual right to re-
cover has been restricted by substantial judicial limitations on the
availability of remedies.
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Comm'n of New
York ,14 the Supreme Court addressed the issues involved in an im-
plied statutory cause of action under Title VI. Besides formally
recognizing the private statutory action for the first time,'5 the
Guardians Court defined a recipient's standard of liability.16 Most
significantly, the Court limited the availability of compensatory
awards to those cases in which the plaintiff proves that the federal
fund recipient discriminated intentionally. 17 Because of the diffi-
culty of proving discriminatory intent,'8 the Guardians decision
has effectively foreclosed compensatory awards to individuals
whom Title VI was intended to protect. This article discusses the
Guardians opinion focusing on its remedial limitation. The article
also discusses a contractually based cause of action that private
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1982).
9. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
12. See Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974).
13. The Supreme Court recently defined "recipient" in Grove City College v.
Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211, 1216-20 (1984). One court has not allowed a corporate plaintiff
to bring suit as a "recipient." See Org. of Minority Vendors v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R.,
579 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
14. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
15. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.




parties can bring in order to obtain compensatory damages for un-
intentional discrimination.
II. Implied Statutory Cause of Action: Guardians Association v. Civil
Service Comm 'n of New York
Guardians involved an employment dispute between the
New York City police department and Black and Hispanic police
officers. 19 The department hired officers according to applicants'
scores on a written examination. 20 Black and Hispanic applicants
as a group received lower scores than did whites.21 Although they
received sufficiently high scores to be hired,22 the plaintiffs, by vir-
tue of their lower scores, were hired after white officers. As a re-
sult, Black and Hispanic officers received less seniority rights than
white officers. In June, 1975, responding to budget cuts affecting
all of New York City,23 the police department laid off officers on a
"last-hired, first-fired" basis. Because they had less seniority,
Black and Hispanic officers were laid off in disproportionate num-
bers.24 The officers challenged the validity of the department's
employment policies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and Title VII of the Act.25
19. The cause of the dispute was the layoff of police officers in June of 1977.
The police department's employment examinations had been the subject of contro-
versy prior to the layoff. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the state
court's refusal to enjoin use of the examinations. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service
Comm'n of New York, 490 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1973).
20. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
21. Judge Robert Carter concluded from a review of a Rand Institute study of
the racial distribution of scores on the police department's examination that
"[w]hites consistently passed at higher rates than minorities and consistently com-
prised the overwhelming majority of individuals in the top deciles." Id. at 540.
22. Id. at 549.
23. Id. at 531.
24. Id. at 549 n.45 ("In the recent layoffs, 9.8% of the white police officers were
laid-off. In sharp contrast, 18% of the black officers were laid-off, and 22% of the
Hispanic officers were laid-off.").
25. Dual claims under both Title VI and Title VII are likely to occur when em-
ployees of a federally-funded employer allege racially-based employment discrimi-
nation. Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
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The dispute endured a complex course of litigation before
reaching the Supreme Court. In 1977, the district court found that
the department's entry examination had a racially discriminatory
impact and therefore violated Title VII's prohibition on race dis-
crimination in employment.26 The court issued a preliminary in-
junction restraining the department from firing or recalling any
police officers until the examination's discriminatory effects were
removed from the department's seniority list.27 In order to re-
move the discriminatory effects of the examination, the depart-
ment was to improve the position of Black and Hispanic officers on
the list, thereby changing their lay-off and recall priority in rela-
tion to white officers. In effect, the court required the department
to place Black and Hispanic officers in the position on the seniority
list that they would have had but for the examination's discrimina-
tory effects.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded
the case 28 for reconsideration in light of the then-recent Supreme
Court decision in Teamsters v. United States .29 In Teamsters, the
Court held that a bona fide seniority system does not violate Title
VII simply because it perpetuates the effects of pre-Act
discrimination. 30.
On remand, the district court found that the police depart-
ment's use of examination scores had caused discriminatory refus-
als to hire after March 24, 1972.3' Consequently, the court limited
application of its previous Title VII decision to plaintiffs hired af-
ter March 24, 1972.32 The court, however, went on to find a Title
26. Guardians, 431 F. Supp. 526, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Through the use of statis-
tical evidence, the officers sustained their burden of establishing that the entry ex-
amination had a discriminatory impact. The burden then shifted to the city to show
the entry examination's job-relatedness. The city was unable to show that the tests
were job-related, thus failing to rebut the presumption of discrimination estab-
lished by the plaintiffs. Id. at 538-49. In addition, the court found that the depart-
ment's former minimum height requirement, for which there was no job-related
justification, had a discriminatory impact, thus violating Title VII. Id. at 550-51. No
further discussion of this part of the court's holding has been included because on
remand the district court found, in light of United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553
(1977), the height requirement claim was time-barred. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1278 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Consequently, this claim never reached the Supreme Court.
27. 431 F. Supp. 530, 551.
28. 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
29. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Guardians, 103 S. Ct. 3221,
3224.
30. 431 U.S. 324, 348-56 (1977).
31. 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1277.
32. Id. at 1278. It was of no consequence that at the time of the rehearing all
officers previously laid off had either been rehired or refused reemployment. The
Court reasoned that "[t]he previously furloughed patrolmen still need retroactive
seniority to protect against possible future discriminatory layoffs." Id.
19851
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VI violation and reinstated the full injunction previously issued
under Title VII.33 In arriving at this conclusion, the district court
decided three legal issues related to Title VI. The court held that
private parties may bring statutory claims;34 ruled that both dis-
criminatory impact and intent can serve as the basis for a viola-
tion;35 and held that compensatory remedies are appropriate for
any Title VI violation.36 Therefore, all plaintiffs were awarded
full compensatory seniority under Title VI, that is, extending the
seniority of Black and Hispanic police officers back to the date
upon which they would have been hired but for the department's
discriminatory practices.
On appeal by the police department, the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's Title VII holding,37 but unanimously
overturned the district court's compensatory award under Title
VI.38 The circuit court judges, however, did not agree on the basis
for this decision. The majority of the three-judge panel held that a
Title VI violation requires proof of discriminatory intent.39 Be-
cause the Black and Hispanic officers had not shown that the po-
lice department discriminated intentionally, the majority
concluded that the police officers' Title VI claim failed.40 The re-
maining judge based his decision on the legal conclusion that Title
VI does not provide private parties compensatory remedies regard-
less of the discriminator's intent.4 1 In other words, although the
police officers had a valid claim, they were not entitled to compen-
satory damages under Title VI.
The division within the Second Circuit mirrored the confu-
sion among federal courts regarding Title VI's substantive stan-
dards.42 This disarray resulted from conflicting signals given by
33. Id. at 1287.
34. Id. at 1285.
35. Id. at 1285-87.
36. Id. at 1287.
37. 633 F.2d 232, 254 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court agreed that compensatory
awards were appropriate under Title VII, and remanded the case to the district
court to determine the terms of the award. Id. at 269.
38. Id. at 254.
39. Id. at 274-75 (Coffrin, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 275.
41. Id. at 257-63 (Meskill, J.). The other judges criticized this approach. They
argued that the existence of a private cause of action does not depend on the rem-
edy sought. Id. at 273-74. They claimed the approach would lead to needless litiga-
tion on the question of the compensatory nature of remedies. Finally, they noted
that the logical consequence of Meskill's holding would be reversal of the lower
court's Title VI relief, but affirmance of its non-compensatory elements. Id. at 273-
74.
42. Compare Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983); Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); Lora
[Vol. 3:183
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the Supreme Court in two decisions: Lau v. Nichols 4 3 and Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke.44 Both cases involved a
Title VI action brought by private parties. In Lau, non-English
speaking Chinese students challenged the San Francisco school
system's failure to provide English instruction.45  In Bakke, a
white male who was denied admission to medical school attacked
the school's affirmative action program.46 Although the Court de-
cided the merits in both cases,4 7 it neither explicitly recognized the
existence of a private cause of action nor identified parties who
could bring such an action. Thus, the lower courts were left to de-
fine the private action's availability. Moreover, the two decisions
seemed to contradict each other as to the standard of liability for a
statutory violation. While the Lau Court applied the disparate im-
pact test,48 the Bakke Court held that Title VI incorporated a dis-
criminatory intent standard.49
In Guardians, the Supreme Court neither adequately clari-
fied the legal standards under Title VI nor availed itself of the fer-
tile opportunity the dispute presented. Six Justices voted to affirm
the Second Circuit decision, thereby denying the police officers
constructive seniority and other compensatory relief under Title
VI.50 Much disagreement underlies their decision as reflected by
v. Board of Educ. of New York, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980); Harris v. White, 479 F.
Supp. 996 (D. Mass. 1979) (all three cases adopt an intent standard) with NAACP v.
Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Guadalupe Org., Inc. v.
Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Conway,
476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979), affd on other grounds, 620 F.2d 680 (8th Cir.
1980); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, Fla., 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (adopting
a disparate impact test).
The intent requirement has been a subject of extensive scholarly comment.
See, e.g., Rosemary C. Salomone, Title VI and the Intent/Impact Debate: A Critical
Look at "Coextensiveness," 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 15 (1982); Note, Intent or Im-
pact: Proving Discrimination Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80
Mich. L. Rev. 1095 (1982).
43. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45. 414 U.S. at 564 (White, J., concurring).
46. 438 U.S. at 269-70 (Powell, J.).
47. In Lau, the Supreme Court held that the school system violated Title VI.
414 U.S. at 565-69. In Bakke, the medical school's admission program was held to
violate Title VI. 438 U.S. at 287, 320.
48. 414 U.S. at 568.
49. 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ.). The Court held that Title VI was "coextensive" with the 14th
amendment prohibition. 438 U.S. at 352. The standard of liability under the 14th
amendment was set forth in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976). See
generally Salomone, supra note 42 at 35-42.
50. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, Powel, and O'Connor
formed the majority to affirm. 103 S. Ct. at 3221.
1985]
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the five separate opinions in the case.51 No reasoning is shared by
the majority. The designations in the opinion reflect this divisive-
ness. In most decisions, one Justice delivers the opinion of the
Court.52 But in Guardians, Justice White "announced the judg-
ment of the Court" and it is clear that his written opinion was not
adopted by a majority.53 Nonetheless, because of its comprehen-
siveness and its essential agreement with other Justices, Justice
White's opinion will come to represent the Court's reasoning on
most issues.
Guardians defines private parties' rights under Title VI.
First, the Court clarified its decisions in Lau and Bakke by explic-
itly affirming a private party's right to bring a cause of action
under Title VI.54 Justice White relied solely upon the weight of
precedent to support his decision.55
51. Opinions were written by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Marshall,
and Stevens. Id. at 3221.
52. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 103 S. Ct. 3201, 3204 (1983)
("Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court."); Dirks v. S.E.C., 103 S.
Ct. 3255, 3258 (1983) ("Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.").
53. 103 S. Ct. at 3222 ("Justice WHITE announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered the following opinion. .. ").
54. 103 S. Ct. at 3227-28 (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.); id. at 3252 (Ste-
vens, Brennan, and Blackmun, J.J.); id. at 3245 (Marshall, J.).
55. The momentum of its previous decisions in Lau, Bakke, and Cannon, in
which the Court implied a private action in Title IX, provided sufficient grounds
for the Court to imply a private cause of action in Title VI. 103 S. Ct. at 3227-28.
The opinion completely disregarded the formal standards for implying a private
cause of action set out in Cort v. Ash:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legis-
lative scheme to imply such remedy for the plaintiff?. And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law...?
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Neither Lau nor
Bakke discusses the basis for implying a private cause of action. Cannon contains
an extensive, although unprincipled, analysis of supportive legislative intent. 441
U.S. at 712-16. Nonetheless, the Court has never applied a Cort analysis to Title VI
although there is authority for the proposition that such an analysis would be suc-
cessful. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 420-21 n.28 (1977) (Stevens, J.); Comment, Civil
Rights: Title VI-Is a Private Right of Action Intended?, 19 Washburn L. Rev. 565,
566 (1980); Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under Title VI, 37 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 297, 300 (1980).
In avoiding a Cort analysis, Guardians reflects several judicial attitudes. First,
it indicates Justice White's ambivalence about inferring a private cause of action
under Title VI. In Bakke, Justice White frankly stated that Title VI did not pro-
vide a private remedy. 438 U.S. 265, 380-81, 387. He relied upon a Cart analysis for
his finding. In Guardians, however, Justice White wrote the majority opinion sup-
porting implication. His belief that a Cort analysis compelled a contrary conclusion
forced Justice White to use an inconsistent approach in Guardians.
The failure to rely upon Cort also reflects the entire Court's increasing displea-
[Vol. 3:183
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Second, the Court held that discriminatory impact alone can
sure with that method. This displeasure may have resulted from the ease with
which private causes of action came to be implied. Prior to 1975, courts facing an
implication question focused on whether the plaintiff belonged to the class of per-
sons for whose special benefit the statute had been enacted. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) ("While this language makes no specific reference
to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,'
which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result."). Implication, as a result, was commonplace. But since the adoption of
Cort, the Court has been reluctant to imply private rights. See, e.g., Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 (1981); Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1981); Universities Research Ass'n v. Con-
tee, 450 U.S. 754, 771-73 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578-
79 (1979). In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1980), the
Court indicated that it would emphasize congressional intent to provide a private
cause of action to a greater extent than it had in its previous implication analyses.
Behind this shift existed a clear concern that "[i]n recent years ... a Court that is
properly concerned about the burdens imposed upon a federal judiciary, the quality
of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has
been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen."
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1981) (Stevens, J.). See also Stephen Ronfeldt, Implying Rights of Action for Mi-
norities and the Poor Through Presumptions of Legislative Intent, 34 Hastings L.J.
969 (1983). Civil rights cases have been, however, a noticeable exception from this
restrictive trend. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Unfor-
tunately, because it lacks a clear analytical focus, the Guardians decision does not
clarify Cort's remaining vitality. See also Thomas Hazen, Implied Private Remedies
Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Se-
curities Regulation and Beyond, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1333 (1980).
Justice White intimated in Guardians that the 11th amendment might affect
private actions against states. 103 S. Ct. at 3223. The lth amendment provides
that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend-
ment XI. The amendment was intended to prohibit a federal determination of a
"contractually rooted" right flowing between a citizen and the state. Warner v. Bd.
of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of New Orleans, 277 F. Supp. 736, 739 (E.D. La.
1967). The scope of its protection has been strictly limited to the states themselves.
See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
(actions against a county can be maintained in federal courts in order to vindicate
federally guaranteed rights); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906) (suit against
county officers appointed by the state to require them to assess and collect a tax to
pay a judgment on township bonds is not a suit against the state); Markham v. City
of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 1961) ("[Ihe Eleventh Amendment
does not extend to cities."). More accurately, the 11th amendment's prohibition ap-
plies if state funds will pay for any liability. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 (1944); Kennecott Copper Corp. v, State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946). But
see, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (the 11th amendment does not bar an ac-
tion in federal court seeking to redress a 14th amendment claim).
Absent waiver of immunity, the 11th amendment would be an absolute bar to a
private Title VI action against a state. See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. Health Sciences/
The Chicago Medical School, 710 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1983). The threshold question
becomes whether a state which accepts federal funds with the Title VI condition
waives the state's 11th amendment defenses. Under Edelman v. Jordan, the Court
will find such a waiver "only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other rea-
Law and Inequality [Vol. 3:183
support a finding that behavior violates Title VI.56 The Court
avoided resolving the conflict between Lau and Bakke by not de-
fining the standard of liability the statute itself imposes on fund
recipients. 57 Instead, the Guardians decision relied upon the dis-
parate impact standard codified in Title VI's administrative regula-
tions. 58 In Title VI, Congress granted agencies power to
promulgate regulations to enforce the statute.59 The Guardians
decision has made a violation of the regulatory standard equivalent
to a violation of the statute. 60 Thus, the Court rejected Lau as a
broad statement of Title VI liability. Instead, the Court inter-
preted Lau for the proposition that administrative regulations es-
tablish the standards for statutory causes of action.6 1
Third, Guardians identified the remedies available to private
parties.62 The Court upheld that part of the district court's order
sonable construction.'" 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling
Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909). The compliance agreements which all recipients of
federal funds must sign should be held to satisfy the Edelman criteria. It is unclear
whether courts will accept this argument. Unfortunately, Guardians failed to ex-
plore the force of the 11th amendment defense as fully as it did other obstacles to a
private claim under Title VI.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 3226-27 (White, J.); id. at 3240-43 (Marshall, J.); id. at 3254-55
(Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.).
57. 103 S. Ct. at 3236-37 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment with Burger,
C.J. and Rehnquist, J.); id. at 3237 (O'Connor, J.); id. at 3253 (Stevens, Brennan,
Blackmun, JJ.). Four members of the Court wrote that Bakke overturned Lau.
103 S. Ct. 3221, 3237 (Powell, J., joined by Burger and Rehnquist); id. at 3239
(O'Connor, J.). Justice White wrote that Bakke did not overturn Lau. Id. at 3226.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 3226-27 (White, J.); id. at 3240-43 (Marshall, J.); id. at 3254-55
(Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
60. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376 n.41
(1973).
While the Lau Court gave complete deference to the administrative interpreta-
tion of Title VI, 414 U.S. at 570, the Guardians Court examined the relationship
between the regulations and the statute. 103 S. Ct. at 3227. However, the Justices
did not agree on the standard of review. Justice White applied a "clearly inconsis-
tent" standard. Id. at 3221, 3227. Justice Marshall upheld the regulations because
they "reasonably and contemporaneously" interpret the statute. Id. at 3243. Jus-
tice Stevens applied a nexus test: whether the regulations are "reasonably related
to the purpose of the enabling legislation." Id. at 3254. Nonetheless, a relationship
test is the usual criterion applied when a plaintiff challenges administrative regula-
tions interpreting the statute under which he or she claims.
61. In holding that administrative regulations are authority for establishing the
standard for a prima facie case, the Court did not identify which particular regula-
tions establish the cause of action. Instead, Justice White wrote generally of all
agencies promulgating rules under Title VI. 103 S. Ct. at 3226-27. Justice Marshall
based his conclusions on "the background of administrative regulations." Id. at
3240. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun referred specifically to the rules
promulgated by the three agencies involved in Guardians. Id. at 3253-54. The ma-
jority's vagueness would allow a lower court to borrow a liability standard from an
agency which had not even granted funds to the defendant.
62. The Court necessarily decided the issue of remedies. While the Court in
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requiring the city to remove discriminatory effects from future ex-
aminations. 63 Yet, the Court denied the plaintiff police officers
any personal recovery under Title VI, including back pay and ben-
efits.64 The Court also refused to grant minority officers the sen-
iority rights they would have had but for the examination's
discriminatory effects.65 Under Guardians, private parties injured
by practices with an impermissible disparate impact on racial mi-
norities may only obtain declaratory or prospective injunctive re-
lief calculated to change the discriminating party's future
behavior.66 Justice White reasoned that to grant compensatory
damages as well as injunctive relief would hinder efforts to
achieve statutory compliance and would not respect a fund recipi-
ent's choice to discontinue its obligations under the statute. There-
fore, Guardians limited compensatory relief to those violations
based on discriminatory intent.67
The Court's remedial holding can be criticized on several
Guardians disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit on the issue of liability, see supra
text accompanying notes 39 and 56, it affirmed the lower court's holding that the
New York City police department was not required to compensate the plaintiffs on
their Title VI claim. Id. at 3222. Therefore, the decision affirming the appeals
court turned on the issue of the remedy available.
When members of the Court disagree, the narrowest position represents the
Court's holding. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). Justice White's
opinion represents the majority in Guardians. Justice White wrote, with Justice
Rehnquist concurring, that a private party is limited to prospective injunctive relief
when liability has been established by satisfying a disparate impact test. 103 S. Ct.
3221, 3232. Justice O'Connor would provide plaintiffs both prospective and retroac-
tive equitable relief. Id. at 3237. See aLso Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S.
Ct. 1248, 1252 n.9 (1984); Guardians, 103 S. Ct. at 3235 n.27 (White, J.) ("Justice
O'Connor would hold that all relief should be denied unless discriminatory intent is
proven."). Justice Marshall states, id. at 3239, and Justices Stevens, Brennan and
Blackmun also write, id. at 3251-52, that all remedies should be available for any
Title VI violation. A majority of the Court agrees that private parties should re-
ceive a remedy for a successful disparate impact claim. Because Justices White and
Rehnquist would give the least amount of remedy, their opinion represents the ma-
jority of the Court. Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger would not provide any
relief to parties relying upon a disparate impact claim. Id. at 3237.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3233-34.
65. Id. at 3234.
66. Id.
67. Justice White wrote, with Justice Rehnquist concurring, that compensatory
relief could be granted upon a showing of discriminatory intent. Guardians, 103 S.
Ct. 3221, 3229-30:
In cases where intentional discrimination has been shown, there can
be no question as to what the recipient's obligation under the program
was and no question that the recipient was aware of that obligation. In
such situations, it may be that the victim of the intentional discrimina-
tion should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well as to prospec-
tive relief in the event the state continues ith the program.
Justices Marshall, Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun would agree with this view,
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grounds. The concern of the Guardians Court is to promote com-
pliance with Title VI. The Court permitted remedies that would
change violators' behavior so that their actions comply with the
statute.68 By limiting the federal fund recipient's compensatory li-
ability for a statutory violation to cases of intentional discrimina-
tion, however, the Court removed important incentives for
achieving statutory compliance.
Moreover, the Court feared that the possibility of monetary
damages for unintentional discrimination would discourage partici-
pation in federal funding programs and thereby hinder achieve-
ment of the statute's objectives. 69 Even if some recipients forgo
federal funding to avoid the possibility of liability for compensa-
tory damages, statutory compliance will not be improved by limit-
ing liability for compensatory remedies for two reasons. First, the
reduced risk of liability takes away incentives for recipients to re-
view their procedures for policies or practices with discriminatory
effects. A decrease in self-policing increases burdens on adminis-
trative and judicial forums, thereby delaying compliance. Second,
private parties need the incentive of compensatory awards to bring
suits to enforce compliance. 70 Administrative enforcement of Title
VI has been woefully inadequate.71 In other contexts, the courts
have cited lack of administrative enforcement as a reason to ex-
having stated in their opinions that all remedies should be available for any suc-
cessful Title VI claim.
Technically, because the Court did not find discriminatory intent, the Justice's
statements concerning the availability of compensatory awards in cases involving
discriminatory intent are mere dicta. See Guardians, 103 S. Ct. at 3229 (White, J.)
("I put aside for present purposes those situations involving a private plaintiff who
. . . has been intentionally discriminated against. ... ); id. at 3237 n.1 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment) ("Because ... petitioners have failed to prove in-
tentional discrimination, I have no occasion to address the question whether there
is a private cause of action under Title VI for damages relief."). Some courts have
already interpreted this dicta as an authoritative holding. See, e.g., Marvin H. v.
Austin Indep. School Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1357 (5th Cir. 1983); Carter v. Orleans
Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 1984), Wilder v. City of New York,
568 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), Org. of Minority Vendors v. Ill. Cent. Gulf
R.R., 579 F. Supp. 574, 594-595 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In a subsequent decision, the
Supreme Court confirmed the lower courts' interpretation. Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1252 (1984).
One court has introduced the notion that the 11th amendment may bar damage
claims against the state regardless of the standard used to find a violation. Moreno
v. Texas Southern Univ., 573 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
68. 103 S. Ct. at 3231.
69. Id. at 3232.
70. Joseph Page, State Law and the Damages Remedy Under The Civil Rights
Act Some Problems in Federalism, 43 Den. L.J. 480, 481 (1966); Marshall Shapo,
Constitutional Tort Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev.
277, 325-26 n.249 (1965).
71. Joseph Witherspoon, Administrative Implementation of Civil Rights 17
(1968).
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pand private parties' rights.72 In short, although the Guardians
Court sought to promote statutory compliance, it significantly lim-
ited the incentives to do so. Moreover, the Guardians decision re-
flects a theme in civil rights law that the measuring standard for
remedies is the culpability of the discriminator rather than the
condition of the victim.73 Guardians used the discriminator's
knowledge or intent to determine the availability of compensatory
damages.74 An additional basis for Guardians' denial of construc-
tive seniority to the plaintiff police officers was the Court's con-
cern that such a compensatory remedy "directly implicate[s] the
rights and expectations of perfectly innocent employees. . .."75
This view of remedies is wrong for three reasons. First, bas-
ing civil rights remedies on the discriminator's state of mind is un-
precedented. State of mind does provide an important limitation
to finding liability under other anti-discrimination prohibitions.76
Once a violation is found, however, courts have traditionally had
great flexibility in determining the appropriate remedy.77 Second,
the Court's characterization of the other workers as "innocent" re-
flects too narrow a view of discrimination's effects. Although the
white officers did not directly "cause" the discrimination, they cer-
tainly benefited from it by receiving higher test scores and conse-
quently greater seniority rights. Restitution, the duty to repay
unjustly received gain, is a core principle of our jurisprudential
system.78 The white officers therefore owe a portion of their sen-
iority rights to those officers injured by discrimination. By deny-
ing compensatory awards, Guardians subordinated the interests of
the victims of discrimination to the interests of the unjustly en-
riched third parties.
Third, the Guardians remedial scheme effectively favors
white plaintiffs who allege that they are victims of discrimination
on the basis of race over minority plaintiffs. In most cases, it is dif-
ficult to prove an employer's intent to discriminate. Discrimina-
tion against Blacks and other minorities is easier to prove by
showing the disparate impact of policies or regulations. Ironically,
proving discriminatory intent is easier when employers institute
affirmative action programs giving open preference to minorities
72. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 240 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1961); Hard-
wick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529, 530 (7th Cir. 1961).
73. Freeman, supra note 4, at 1049.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 3230 n.20.
75. Id. at 3234 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 788
(1976)).
76. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
77. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945).
78. George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution 2 (1978).
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over whites in an effort to rectify past discriminatory patterns, as
in Bakke. Thus, Guardians gives more comprehensive relief to
whites than to those whom Title VI was intended to protect.
To some extent, Guardians broke new ground in civil rights
enforcement. By recognizing a private cause of action under Title
VI and identifying a broad scope of liability, the Court has pro-
vided an important tool to use against racial discrimination. By re-
stricting the availability of compensatory awards, however, the
Court has perpetuated an incomplete perception of the causes of
discrimination and has worked a fundamental injustice.
III. Third-Party Beneficiaries: A Contractual Cause of Action
Because it is difficult to demonstrate intent to discriminate
against racial minorities, the private action under Title VI will not
readily provide compensatory awards to most victims of discrimi-
nation. Under a common law theory of third-party beneficiary
contracts, however, those injured parties may be able to recover
compensatory remedies. 79
Generally, a third-party beneficiary is one who, although not
a party to a contract, can enforce the parties' contractual duties
and obligations.8 0 As a condition precedent to the receipt of fed-
eral funds, federal contractors must sign8 ' an assurance to comply
with Title VI.82 The assurance of compliance is part of an enforce-
79. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 850-51 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
453 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1978). But see Todd v. Jt. Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel
Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12, 16 (N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated, 332 F.2d 243 (7th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965). Commentators have discussed third-
party contractual rights in federal contracts. See, e.g., Kay Bruce, Martinez v.
Socoma Companies: Problems in Determining Contract Beneficiaries' Rights, 27
Hastings L.J. 137 (1975). Some commentary has specifically suggested a third-party
contractual claim for a Title VI cause of action, focusing on the creation of rights
and not the explicit achievement of a compensatory remedy. See, e.g., Arthur
Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third Party Benefi-
ciaries, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Title VI Compli-
ance Agreements). See also Michael Wolff, Protecting the Disabled Minority:
Rights and Remedies Under Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
22 St. Louis U.L.J. 25, 58-60 (1978).
80. Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods, 250 Ark. 1003, 468 S.W.2d 239 (1971); Bossier Parish
School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Tenn.
Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Sizemore, 258 Ark. 344, 62 So. 2d 459 (1952); Commercial Ins.
Co. v. Pacific-Peru Construction Corp., 558 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.4 (1984) (Dept. of Agriculture).
82. An agency can make funding contingent upon the signing of a compliance
form. Gardner v. State of Alabama, 385 F.2d 804, 813-17 (5th Cir. 1967), cert de-
nied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968); United States v. El Camino Community College Dist.,
600 F.2d 1258, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980); Grove City
College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684, 703 (3d Cir. 1982) (Title IX); Hillsdale College v. Dep't
of HEW, 698 F.2d 418, 430 (6th Cir. 1982) (Title IX).
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able contract.8 3 Discrimination based on race8 4 is a breach.8 5
Breach of the assurance of compliance may provide the basis for a
third-party claim by the victims of discrimination. Such a claim is
contractual rather than statutory and compensatory remedies are
appropriate.8 6 Whether a third-party beneficiary cause of action is
viable depends upon three unresolved legal issues: first, whether
the assurance of compliance vests contractual rights in third par-
ties; second, if rights are vested, whether courts can grant damages
to remedy violations of those rights; and finally, whether Title VI
83. See, e.g., Idaho Migrant Council v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1981);
U.S. v. Marion County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451
U.S. 910 (1981).
Defendants often cite U.S. v. Madison County Bd of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964), for the proposition that assurances given in
return for federal funds cannot be enforced to remedy discriminatory practices.
The case, however, pre-dates adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Fifth Cir-
cuit distinguished the case twice in cases dealing with the enforcement of Title VI
assurances of compliance. See Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847,
851 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); U.S. v. Marion County School Dist.,
625 F.2d 607, 610 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 910 (1981) ("In Madison,
the government's complaints were dismissed not because the court found that the
United States had no authority to sue to enforce contractual assurances of nondis-
crimination but rather because the court found it clear that the school boards had
made no such assurances.")
84. Discrimination constituting a breach can be proved either by showing intent
to discriminate or acts which have a disparate impact upon a racial minority. Rele-
vant governmental regulations incorporating the disparate impact standard deter-
mine the contract terms.
85. Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1232 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Matin
County School Dist., 625 F.2d 607, 609, 617 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 910
(1981); U.S. v. Phoenix Union High School Dist., 681 F.2d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); U.S. v. El Camino Community College Dist., 600
F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
In addition to assuring compliance, federal fund recipients often enter into
"compliance agreements." Essentially, compliance agreements are out-of-court set-
tlements made by a recipient and an agency after a Title VI violation has been
found. These agreements set forth remedial organizational actions the recipient
must take to insure continued federal financial support. Block argued that these
agreements rather than the assurance of compliance should serve as the basis for a
third-party beneficiary cause of action. Title VI Compliance Agreements, supra
note 79, at 14. Block admitted, however, that courts will award successful third-
party beneficiaries little more than remedies which they could claim in an implied
statutory cause of action. Id. at 38. Given the judicial predilection to avoid actions
which might interfere with a congressionally sanctioned regulatory action, a private
compensatory remedy is unlikely. Furthermore, compliance agreements are exe-
cuted only after administrative agencies have found a violation and taken action.
In addition, administrative enforcement of Title VI has not been comprehensive.
See supra note 71. Therefore, few private parties have the opportunity to rely upon
compliance agreements for their claims.
86. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 346, comment a (1977) ("Every breach of
contract gives the injured party a right to damages against the party in
breach .... ).
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itself does not preempt such an action.8 7 The need to compensate
those injured by discrimination should encourage courts to resolve
these issues affirmatively and uphold third-party claims.
A. The Basis for Third-Party Contractual aims
for Damages
Third-party rights based upon Title VI assurances of compli-
ance have not received significant judicial attention. The Supreme
Court has made cursory statements about the common law con-
tract action in the context of Title VI but has not expressly ruled
on the issue. In Lau, the school board recognized the non-English
speaking Chinese students as beneficiaries of the board's contract
with the federal government in order to bring suit under Title VI.
But because standing was not contested, the Lau Court did not
have the opportunity to validate the students' status as third-party
beneficiaries.8 8 In Guardians, Justice Marshall seemingly ap-
proved the third-party claim.89 Justice White explicitly rejected
this approach.90 Lower federal courts have directly addressed the
issue and in some circumstances have sustained third-party claims
for injunctive relief.9 1 These decisions, however, have not been
widely accepted or even noticed by the courts. Consequently, the
existence of third-party contractual rights and remedies under Ti-
tle VI remain unsettled.
Courts use different approaches to determine the existence of
third-party contractual rights.92 Traditionally, courts rely on one
of three theories: an intention test;93 the donee-creditor-incidental
87. A fourth issue, whether a breach occurred, will be resolved individually in
each case.
88. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571, n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in
result).
89. 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3248 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 3232 n.24 (Rehnquist, J., joining). Because they disapproved of any
private statutory cause of action, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger might
also disapprove of the third-party contractual claims.
91. See Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967); Concerned Tenants Assoc. of Indian Trails Apts. v. Indian
Trails Apts., 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980); N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical
Center, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 280, 329 (D. Del. 1978). But see Nabkey v. U.S. Dep't of
HUD, No. 81-1184, (6th Cir. January 4, 1983) (available July 1, 1985, on LEXIS,
GENFED library, USAPP file) (not recommended for full-text publication; Sixth
Circuit Rule 24 limits citation to specific situations).
92. Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1977), held that state law
determines third-party rights when the obligations of the United States are not at
issue.
93. "In order that a third party may sue upon a contract made by others he
must show that he was intended by them to have an enforceable right or at least
that the performance of the contract must necessarily be of benefit to him and such
benefit must have been within the contemplation and purpose of the contracting
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beneficiary approach of section 133 of the Restatement of Con-
tracts;94 or the intended-incidental beneficiary approach of the
Second Restatement. 95 Other courts refuse to rely upon any single
theory and look instead to all of the circumstances surrounding
the particular claim.96 Categorization of the underlying theories,
however, clarifies little.97 Courts themselves are perplexed by the
doctrines,98 and decisions often reflect underlying equitable con-
parties." Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit Of Third Persons, 27 Yale L.J.
1008, 1017 (1917). See also Ernest Jones, Legal Protection of Third Party Benefi-
ciaries: On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 U. Cirn. L.R. 313, 315 (1977).
94.(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a per-
son other than the promisee, that person is, except as stated in Subsec-
tion (3):
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise
in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the
promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance
thereof is to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a
right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor sup-
posed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears
from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circum-
stances and performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or sup-
posed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of
the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the
Statute of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is un-
enforceable because of the Statute of Frauds;
(c) an incidental beneficary if neither the facts stated in Clause
(a) nor those stated in Clause (b) exist.
(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (la) is a gift promise.
Such a promise as is described in Subsection (ib) is a promise to dis-
charge the promisee's duty.
(3) Where it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the ac-
companying circumstances that the purpose of the promise is to bene-
fit a beneficiary under a trust and the promise is to render
performance to the trustee, the trustee, and not the beneficiary under
the trust, is a beneficiary within the meaning of this Section.
Restatement of Contracts § 133 (1932).
95.(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a benefi-
ciary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the inten-
tion of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an in-
tended beneficiary.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1979).
96. Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1271, 1284 (1932).
97. It is beyond the scope of this article to replicate the scholarly explanation
and criticism of these tests. For more complete discussions see Comment, Martinez
v. Socoma Companies: Problems in Determining Contract Beneficiaries' and the In-
tention Standard.. A Search for Rational Contract Decision Making, 54 Va. L. Rev.
1166 (1968).
98. See, e.g., Bailey v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 213 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa
1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974) ("[Ilt is not always clear as to just what is
meant when the courts say that there must be an intent to benefit the third person
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cerns more than principled legal reasoning.
The narrower question of third-party rights under federal
contracts has been the object of substantial judicial inquiry. For
example, many courts have addressed a federal contract signator's
obligations to third parties. While doctrinally these decisions re-
flect the general disarray of third-party beneficiary law,99 they
identify special considerations which provide some guidance in de-
ciding whether Title VI assurances of compliance vest third-party
rights.
Courts have resisted allowing third-party claims under fed-
eral contracts when the statute does not expressly or impliedly
provide a private cause of action.100 Some courts conclude that
when a statute does not expressly provide a statutory cause of ac-
tion, Congress intended to disallow all private actions. To allow
private actions, they reason, would circumvent congressionally
provided administrative prerogatives. 101 Other courts apply the
recognized standard for implying private statutory actions and im-
or that the intention of the parties is controlling.") (quoting 17 Am. Jur. 2d Con-
tracts, § 304, pp. 727-30).
99. See Jones, supra note 93, at 316; Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied
Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One Government Intent, 94 Yale L.J. 875
(1985); Comment, Martinez v. Socoma Companies: Problems in Determining Con-
tract Benejiciaries' Rights, 48 Hastings L.J. 137, 138 (1975).
100. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lonknit Mfg. Co., 189 F.2d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 1951); Johnson
v. Redevelopment Agency of Oakland, Ca., 317 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1963) ("We
find no indication that Congress intended this section of the Housing Act to give a
right of action to those not a party to the contract between the Redevelopment
Agency and the United States."); Falzarano v. U.S., 607 F.2d 506, 511 (1st Cir. 1979);
Control Data Corp. v. I.B.M., 306 F. Supp. 839, 847 (D. Minn. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d
1277 (8th Cir. 1970); Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 283 F. Supp. 314, 321 (E.D.
Id. 1968); Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745, 750
(E.D.N.Y. 1966); City and County of San Francisco v. Western Airlines, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 953 (1963); Carson v.
Pierce, 546 F. Supp. 80, 87 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Boston Pub. Hous. Tenants' Policy
Council, Inc. v. Lynn, 388 F. Supp. 493 (D. Mass. 1974); Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979); Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d at 1210, 1218 (4th Cir.
1981); Fenner v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Md. 1976); Murphy
v. Villanova Univ., 547 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v.
City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927, 946 (C.D. Cal. 1979). But see Bethune v.
U.S. Dep't of HUD, 376 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (court found third-
party rights because the statute did not provide an adequate remedy); Fuzie v.
Manor Care, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (court found third-party
contractual rights under state law even though a federal implied statutory action
did not exist); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979). In some cases, the con-
tract or statute explicitly forbids third-party actions. See, e.g., East Bay Mun. Util-
ity Dist. v. Richmond Agency, 93 Cal. App. 3d 346, 155 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1979).
101. See, e.g., New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F. Supp. 1303, 1316
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("It would be anomalous to hold that the statute provides greater
relief indirectly than it provides directly .. "); Fenner v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409
F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Md. 1976) (rights asserted would be inconsistent with need
for administrative flexibility).
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ply third-party contractual rights as well.102 The result, however,
is often the same; where there are no statutory rights, courts are
unlikely to find third-party rights.
Courts generally rely upon statutory, regulatory or contrac-
tual references to specific third parties to vest in them the right to
enforce the contract. Some courts require only that the language
evince an intent to permit third-party actions.103 Most courts,
however, require explicit language that the third party was in-
tended to benefit from the contract's performance. 104 For exam-
ple, in Owens v. Haas, a prisoner recovered damages from the
county for injuries resulting from a beating by prison guards.105
The court held the county liable by characterizing the prisoner as
a beneficiary of the county's contract with the federal government
for the safekeeping and protection of prisoners. 0 6 In Fuzie v.
Manor Care, Inc., a Medicaid recipient sued her nursing home for
transferring and discharging patients who were supported by
Medicaid. 07 A contract between the federal government and the
nursing home provided for a certain minimum level of care for
Medicaid patients. Because Medicaid patients explicitly benefited
from the contract, the court held that the plaintiff had standing as
a third-party beneficiary to sue the nursing home.'08
Courts are even more reluctant to find third-party rights
when the contract has a public purpose. Contracts have a public
purpose when their execution necessarily benefits a defined group.
They do not evince a specific intention to convey third-party rights
to particular individuals. For example, one court held that neigh-
bors of a planned redevelopment project lacked standing to sue
102. The Supreme Court defined the recognized standard for implication in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). See, e.g., Ngoyen v. U.S. Catholic Conf., 719 F.2d 52
(3d Cir. 1983); Robinson v. McGovern, 456 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
103. See supra note 93.
104. Although significantly narrower in scope, the concept of third-party rights
is akin to the test for standing to bring a suit under a statute. See Rosado v. Wy-
man, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). The similarity can be
seen in cases in which the plaintiffs brought both statutory and third-party claims.
See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Blackshore Residents Org. v. Hous. Auth.,
347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972). But see Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273
(7th Cir. 1981) ("Subsidiary purposes ... do not defeat plaintiff's status as pro-
tected beneficiaries. In contrast, many courts which have not found third-party
rights essentially assume that statutory purposes are mutually exclusive.").
105. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
106. Id. at 1250-51.
107. 461 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ohio).
108. Id. at 697-98. See also Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Dillon
v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ala. 1976); Org. of Minority Vendors,
Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 579 F. Supp. 574, 598-605 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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when the developer failed to comply with the open-bidding provi-
sion of its federal contract.10 9 The contract required the developer
to conduct open bidding for property sold as part of the project.
The court held that this provision "seem[ed] designed to protect
not the interests of landowners or tenants in a redevelopment
area, but those of the public at large."1no As a result, the contract
vested special rights in no one.
In Bailey v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., the court rejected a
third-party claim by workers based on a consent decree that their
employer had entered into in a federal anti-trust suit."' In the
consent decree, the employer, a meat packer, had agreed to divest
itself of two packing plants it had recently acquired.l1 2 The con-
sent decree provided that the employer could not take action in re-
gard to those plants' employees."13 Subsequently, one of the plants
was temporarily closed and the employees were laid off for two
months.114 The affected employees sued as third-party benefi-
ciaries to enforce the terms of the consent decree. In denying the
employees' claim, the court stated that the contract provision's pri-
mary purpose was public-to keep the assets of the company "at-
tractive to potential purchasers."" 5 The court also interpreted the
contract in light of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act's general purpose:
"to give each citizen whatever protection it can against the monop-
olistic concentration of economic power."11 6 The court went on to
conclude that "[n]o special protections are accorded plaintiff's class
or any other class." 117
Some courts have extended the public purpose basis for re-
jecting third-party claims further to contracts with mixed purposes
or which contain ambiguous language. In Martinez v. Socoma
Companies, the court held that residents of East Los Angeles were
109. Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
110. Id. at 250.
111. 213 N.W.2d 642 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974).
112. Id. at 643.
113. Id. at 643 ("[Defendant] ... shall take no action with respect to the person-
nel or assets of Blue Ribbon which would impair [defendant's] ability to accomplish
the divestiture.").
114. Id. at 644.
115. Id. at 646.
116. Id. at 647.
117. Id. See also City & County of San Francisco v. Western Airlines, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 953 (1963). In denying
an airline third-party rights under a federal contract made pursuant to the Federal
Airport Act, the court held that "[t]he various documents and agreements were
part of a federal aid program directed to the promoting of a national transportation
system." Id. at 120. See also Control Data Corp. v. I.B.M., 306 F. Supp. 839, 846-48
(D. Minn. 1969) (competitor was not a third-party beneficiary to a consent decree
which settled an anti-trust case).
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not third-party beneficiaries to federal contracts to provide train-
ing and employment."i 8 The 1967 amendments to the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964 authorized the U.S. Department of Labor
to make these contracts."i 9 The statute's express purpose was to
"establish special programs which (1) are directed to the solution
of the critical problems existing in particular communities or
neighborhoods. . ., and (2) are of sufficient size and scope to have
an appreciable impact in such communities and neighborhoods in
arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment,
and rising community tensions."1 2 0 The court observed that the
government intended to benefit the neighbors through the con-
tract's performance.' 21 Nonetheless, the court found this intention
insufficient to grant the plaintiffs third-party rights because of the
contract's purpose to improve the neighborhood rather than to
benefit individuals.122 Although courts have not widely followed
Martinez,123 other courts interpret a contract's public purpose
broadly as a justification for denying third-party claims.n4
To summarize, the courts will generally find third-party
rights in federal contracts in two situations. First, third-party
rights will vest if the governing statute expressly or implicitly rec-
ognizes private causes of action. 2 5 Second, courts will recognize
third-party rights if the contract explicitly singles out the claim-
ant's class to receive benefits.1 26
118. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585, 521 P.2d 841 (1974).
119. Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 90-222,
§§ 150-155, 81 Stat. 688-90, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2763-2768 (1967), repealed by 86 Stat. 763
(1972).
120. Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 150, 81 Stat. 688.
121. 11 Cal. 3d at 397, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587, 521 P.2d at 843.
122. 11 Cal. 3d at 406, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93, 521 P.2d at 848-49. "(Mhe con-
tracts were designed not to benefit individuals as such but to utilize the training
and employment of disadvantaged persons as a means of improving the East Los
Angeles neighborhood.")
123. Martinez has been criticized. See Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the
Intention Standard: A Search for Rational Contract Decision Making, 54 Va. L.
Rev. 1166 (1968).
124. See, e.g., Port of New York Auth. v. Eastern Airlines, 259 F. Supp. 745
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). The court rejected an airline's third-party claim that the Author-
ity breached an agreement with the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 eL seq., 49
U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq. Among other purposes, the statute directs the Secretary of
Transportation to promote, encourage, and develop civil aeronautics. 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 1303(b). The court held that the agreements "were not made expressly for the
benefit of the airlines." 259 F. Supp. at 750. But civil aeronautics cannot improve
without benefiting particular airlines, albeit incidentally. Thus, as in Martinez, the
necessary result of a contract's express purpose is not a sufficient basis to find
third-party rights. See also City & County of San Francisco v. Western Airlines,
204 Cal. App. 2d 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 953 (1963).
125. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
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Title VI assurances of compliance satisfy these conditions.
Thus, courts should recognize third-party rights to enforce these
assurances. The Guardians court firmly held that private parties
can bring a statutory claim under Title VI.127 Although the stat-
ute's prohibitory language does vitiate its beneficial nature, Title
VI explicitly protects racial groups by protecting individuals.128
Further, administrative regulations make explicit that Title VI is
not intended primarily to serve a public purpose. 2 9 All the tradi-
tional requirements are met and courts should recognize third-
party contractual rights allowing private parties to receive com-
pensatory damages for a federal fund recipient's breach of its
agreement to comply with Title VI.130
B. Federal Preemption of State Contract Claim
Because the two causes of action regulate the same discrimi-
natory behavior, the private cause of action under Title VI could
preempt enforcement of the state third-party contractual claim.
Congress' power to preempt state law derives from the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution. 131 If Congress acts
127. Guardians, 103 S. Ct. at 3223.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ["No person ..... ] Some courts have held that the pur-
pose of Title VI compels affirmative remedies. These courts have awarded tangible
benefits to individual groups. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd.v. Lemon, 370 F.2d
847, 850-51 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc. 453 F. Supp. 330 (D. Del. 1978). But see Todd v. Jt. Appren-
ticeship Comm. of Steel Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963), va-
cated, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964). In other circumstances, Title VI requires that
discriminatory tests or regulations be reformed or rescinded. See, e.g., Guardians,
103 S. Ct. 3221. These remedies provide the benefit of increased opportunity to in-
dividuals in the protected group.
129. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 100 (1983) (Department of Education).
130. Ernst v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978); U.S. v. Thomas Bourne Assoc., 367 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Pa.
1973); First Granite City Nat'l Bank v. Champion, 130 Ill. App. 2d 970, 268 N.E.2d 35
(1970); Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa 1982); E. Allan Farnsworth, Con-
tracts 734 (1982).
Of course, whether compensatory damages will actually be awarded requires
more than just recognition of the right to bring the claim. A third-party claimant
must demonstrate that the defendant breached the contract, causing a compensable
injury.
131. Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982)
('"The pre-emption doctrine.., has its roots in the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.,
art. VI cl. 2."); Comment, Preemption of Reconcilable State Regulation: Federal
Benefit Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 Hastings L.J. 685, 686 (1983)
('"e supremacy clause mandates preemption of state laws which conflict with the
Congressional exercise of an enumerated power."). But see Harrop A. Freeman,
Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 De Paul L. Rev. 630, 634-
37 ("The most common misconception found in the cases and the literature is that
the doctrine of preemption must hinge on the supremacy clause."); Comment, Con-
stitutional Law: Congressional Preemption Held to Prevent State from Enforcing
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within the scope of its powers, state law is preempted in the same
area to the extent Congress intended its enactment to be exclu-
sive.13 2 The Eleventh Circuit has held that a federal civil rights
statute may thus preempt a third-party contractual claim. 33
In Howard v. Uniroyal, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that
section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973134 preempted a state
third-party claim based upon contractual assurances to comply
with that section.135 The statute requires federal contracts to con-
tain a provision mandating employers to affirmatively hire and
promote handicapped individuals36 and provides for the adminis-
trative enforcement of the provisions. 3 7 Uniroyal's contract with
the federal government provided in part that it "take affirmative
action to employ, advance in employment and otherwise treat
qualified handicapped individuals without discrimination based
upon their physical or mental handicap in all employment prac-
tices."' 3 Joel Howard sought damages and injunctive relief be-
cause he was demoted "from a salaried position to a more
physically strenuous hourly position." 3 9 Howard argued that be-
cause he was handicapped, his demotion constituted a breach of
Uniroyal's agreement which he had a right to enforce as a third-
party beneficiary. In rejecting Howard's contractual claim, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the remedy provided in precise
detail by Congress in enacting section 503(b) was intended to be
the plaintiff's sole means of enforcing the affirmative action clause
contained in the contract between his employer and the federal
government."140
Because it found no express congressional intent regarding
Stricter Pollution Standards Against Electrical Power Plant, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 1223,
1224 (1971) ("Preemption is a doctrine of statutory construction.").
132. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1430
(1984); Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.,
103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Re-
tail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) ("[San Diego Coun-
cil v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)], however, does not state a constitutional
principle; it merely rationalizes the problems of coexistence between federal and
state regulatory schemes. . . .The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.").
133. Howard v. Uniroyal, 719 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983).
134. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793 (1973).
135. 719 F.2d at 1562.
136. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793(a).
137. 29 U.S.C.A. § 793(b).
138. 719 F.2d at 1554 n.2.
139. Id. at 1555.
140. Id.
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preemption,141 the Eleventh Circuit relied on standards articulated
by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Nelson to imply the
statute's preemptive scope. 142 In Nelson, the Supreme Court de-
fined three tests to imply the preemptive force of federal stat-
utes.143 Federal law will preempt state law if: "'[t]he scheme of
federal regulation [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it,' "'44 or, "'the federal statutes touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,' "145 or,
"enforcement of state ... acts presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program."146 The Howard
court found section 503's administrative enforcement scheme both
comprehensive and pervasive. 14 7 It also found that the federal in-
terest in promoting uniform enforcement of federal contracts out-
weighed the state's traditional interest in preserving contracts.148
Finally, the court reasoned that third-party beneficiary actions
would "conflict" with a uniform federal scheme to enforce the
contracts.149
Generally, preemption cases have not provided "precise
guidelines"150 for determining the preemptive scope of other fed-
eral statutes. Rather, each case turns on the peculiar statute in
question and the asserted state claim.15i Therefore, because How-
141. Id. at 1559.
142. Although Howard broadly accepts the Nelson framework, id. at 1555, the
tests are employed after no explicit congressional intent to preempt can be found.
Id. at 1559. Nelson provides, therefore, standards for implicating congressional
intent.
143. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
144. Id. at 502 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
145. Id. at 504 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
146. Id. at 505.
147. 719 F.2d at 1559.
148. Id. at 1560.
149. Id. at 1561.
150. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973)
("[P]rior cases on preemption are not precise guidelines. ., for each case turns on
the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in ques-
tion."); NoteThe Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 624 (1975) ("The Supreme Court, however,
has not developed a uniform approach to preemption; its decisions in this area take
on an ad hoc, unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal
basis.").
151. Two recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate this principle. In Pacific Gas
and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190
(1983), the Court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-
2296, did not preempt a California statute regulating nuclear power plant construc-
tion. California conditions its permission to construct nuclear power plants on find-
ings by the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
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ard concerned the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it does not have
stare decisis effect on the issue of whether Title VI preempts a
third-party contract claim. Nonetheless, read broadly, Howard
suggests that federal civil rights statutes can preempt third-party
claims and is precedent with which a private party seeking to en-
force civil rights conditions on federal grants must contend.
Even if the broad preemption method used in Howard ap-
plies, 5 2 Title VI would not preempt a state contract claim to en-
that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available. Cal. Pub. Res.
Code §§ 25524.1(b) and 2554.2 (West 1977). The Court held that "the federal gov-
ernment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited
powers expressly ceded to the states." Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 212. Because it was
enacted for economic purposes, the California statute "lies outside the occupied
field of nuclear safety regulation" and therefore is not preempted by the federal
law. Id. at 216. In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1983), the Court
held that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a state award of punitive dam-
ages to a victim of radiation hazards. The Court based its decision on the lack of
congressional intent to disallow state remedies for personal injuries. Id. at 623-26.
The dissenters, however, observed that "the purpose of punitive damages is to regu-
late safety." Id. at 629 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Punitive damages ... are 'reg-
ulatory' in nature rather than compensatory." Id. at 635 (Powell, J., dissenting).
They concluded that in light of the holding in Pacific Gas such state regulation of
safety is preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. Id. at 629 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing), id. at 636 (Powell, J., dissenting). These two cases demonstrate the fluidity of
precedent in the context of preemption decisions.
152. Preemption doctrine is both confusing and overbroad. The confusion re-
suits from the Supreme Court's continual redefinition of preemption standards in
ambiguous terms. Compare Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1968), with Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). An observation made by
Justice Black remains true:
[This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in light of ...
federal laws touching the same subject has made use of the following
expressions: conflicting;, contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance;
difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and
interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible con-
stitutional test or an exclusive yardstick. In the final analysis, there
can be no one crystal clear, distinctly marked formula.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Note, The Preemption Doc-
trine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
623, 624 (1975) ("The Supreme Court, however, has not developed a uniform ap-
proach to preemption.")
Indeed, although they articulate standards similar to those in Nelson, recent
Supreme Court decisions have not been as doctrinal in their reasoning as Howard
nor have they expressly relied upon Nelson. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984); Pacific Gas and Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). The modern Court has taken "a state directed"
posture. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 623, 653 (1975). Recent decisions reflect a bias
for preserving state action absent strong contrary congressional intent. Silkwood,
104 S. Ct. 615 (1984); Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). Because it ignores the mod-
ern prediliction of the Supreme Court, Howard may not provide useful standards
for determining the preemptive relationship between Title VI and third-party con-
tract claims.
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force assurances of compliance. In Howard, the court found that
the statute preempted the state action because of the comprehen-
siveness of the federal administrative regulation and the need for
national uniformity.153 Title VI, however, expressly authorizes
agencies to use state or local law to enforce its provisions. 54 In al-
lowing state law to enforce Title VI, Congress indicated that uni-
formity was not essential to its enforcement scheme. Thus, private
parties can enforce Title VI assurances of compliance as third-
party beneficiaries to those agreements.
IV. Summary
By restricting the availability of compensatory remedies for
Title VI violations, the Guardians decision ignored the individual
experience of discrimination. This perspective offends concepts of
justice and remedial purpose central to our jurisprudential system.
As third-party beneficiaries, victims of racial discrimination should
be able to bring a cause of action for compensatory awards based
on the federal fund recipients' breach of its agreement to comply
with Title VI. Only compensatory damages fully acknowledge the
injury discrimination victims experience as individuals. Law is an
effective and appropriate means by which to engineer social pro-
gress. However, law has another, equally fundamental purpose-
to do justice for individuals. The entire legal system's treatment of
racial discrimination must expand beyond attempts to stop future
wrongs. It must include compensation for individual victims as
well.
153. 719 F.2d at 1559-61.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d(1) ("Compliance with any requirements adopted pursuant
to this section may be effected . . . (2) by any other means authorized by law.")
The statute is vague as to who may seek compliance by such means. The legislative
history, however, makes it clear that administrative remedies may use such means.
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2391, 2401. The administrative regulations provide for enforcement under
"any applicable proceeding under State or local law." 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)(2).
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